

## Preliminary Report: Woodfibre LNG Wildfire July 20<sup>th</sup> 2021

### Introduction

A wildfire occurred on the existing brownfield Woodfibre site formerly the Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish Nation) village known as Swiyát on July 20, 2021. Pursuant to the Federal environmental assessment approval and Federal Decision Statement (FDS), as amended March 7, 2018, Woodfibre LNG Limited (Woodfibre LNG) is providing this report consistent with the reporting requirements of condition 11.4.3 of the FDS. The report is structured consistent with conditions.

The Woodfibre LNG Project is not currently under construction, however, as a brownfield site a number of activities are ongoing e.g., power generation, compliance with applicable permits and approvals and site maintenance. Further, the site is crossed by utilities infrastructure e.g., gas lines operated by FortisBC and power transmission systems operated by BC Hydro.



*Image 1: drone photo of impacted area, taken August 11th*

## 1. Description of the incident

Woodfibre LNG were notified of smoke emanating from the site on the evening on July 20, 2021. Concurrently the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had notified the BC Wildfire Service regarding a potential fire at the Woodfibre site.

The fire occurred predominantly in District Lot 6232, close to the border with District Lot 5899, in the BC Hydro right of way. The fire burned 0.24 hectares above the site and the power supply to the WLNG site from BC Hydro 1L31 distribution line from Cheekye power supply was disrupted.

Fire suppression response continued by BC Wildfire Service from July 20 to July 23, 2021, when the fire was deemed extinguished. BC Hydro mobilised to the site on July 21, 2021 to manage their infrastructure and maintain electrical safety for first responders. Following approval to proceed, BC Hydro then replaced damaged infrastructure.

## 2 Measures taken by proponent to mitigate the adverse environmental effects of the incident

Consistent with the site Emergency Response Plan (ERP), site personnel mobilized to the site, along with contractors from BC Timber Sales who were conducting forestry operations on the site. Upon arrival on site it was determined the fire was in an area that no work by Woodfibre LNG personnel or contractors was or had been undertaken and it proximal to the BC Hydro right of way. An incident command system was initiated by Woodfibre LNG staff to tackle the wildfire.

Incident command was maintained briefly until the site commander of BC Wildfire Services took over who requested no further assistance from Woodfibre LNG personnel. Wildfire suppression and response was then implemented by the BC Wildfire Services. Woodfibre LNG continued to provide support to the BC Wildfire Services including;

- Logistical support – including access to existing infrastructure including docks, barge landings and site roads. Vehicles and other equipment were made available. Some repairs/upgrades to site roads was conducted to facilitate access. This included Woodfibre LNG contractors supporting site access to/from the site and around the site;
- Communication – both through the incident command system but also coordinating other contractors and vessel movements; and
- Administrative / other – with the existing facilities on the site crews were supporting with access to offices, washrooms, lunch rooms and food/beverages.

Woodfibre LNG also notified other parties related to the existing utilities on site e.g., BC Hydro and Rogers Communications. Woodfibre LNG maintained communications with BC Hydro regarding interruption in power supply as this informed mitigations regarding the existing leachate and water treatment plants on site.

The emergency generator for the water treatment plant operated automatically as planned. However, consistent with authorisations, Woodfibre LNG took the decision to hold leachate in the onsite storage tanks. Once BC Hydro restored power leachate was routed through the treatment plant and discharged consistent with applicable approvals.

### 3 Any views received by relevant federal and provincial authorities and aboriginal groups with respect to the accident

Woodfibre LNG notified in writing information regarding the wildfire to relevant agencies e.g., BC Ministry of Forests Lands and Natural Resources Operations and Rural Development, BC Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy, BC Oil and Gas Commission, District of Squamish, Squamish Lillooet Regional District, BC Environmental Assessment Office and the Impact Assessment Agency of Canada. It was noted that the RCMP were already aware of the incident. Concurrently Aboriginal groups, as defined in the FDS, were notified on July 21, 2021.

Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish Nation) expressed concern regarding safety and the ongoing protection of Nexwnéwu7ts Átlk'a7tsem (Howe Sound) and requested daily reports on details of the steps being taken to protect Howe Sound. These were provided along with information regarding ongoing compliance with existing permits and approvals through to July 23, 2021.

The BC Oil and Gas Commission were informed of the fire on the morning of July 21st and updated when the fire was officially declared out; they expressed appreciation at being kept informed at the next routine meeting.

### 4 A description of adverse environmental effects

Approximately 0.24 ha of underbrush within the previously cleared and maintained BC Hydro right of way burned; three power poles in this area were damaged by the fire and required replacement by BC Hydro.

As noted above, water was drawn from Howe Sound and adjacent streams in order to suppress the fire. This occurred temporarily and only for the purposes of fire suppression consistent with the BC *Water Sustainability Act*. While this may have temporarily reduced stream flow, effects to streams are not anticipated. However, bucketing of saltwater may have localized impacts to soil chemistry which in turn may affect vegetation.

A QP will inspect the site to determine if any remedial action is necessary [such as seeding for soil stabilisation or invasive species spread mitigation]; any such action will be noted in the 90 day report.


### 5 Details concerning the implement of the emergency response plan

The emergency response plan was implemented with incident command protocols activated in a timely manner. However, the BC Wildfire Services took over incident command and did not request assistance from site personnel and requested that site personnel stand down from any plans to join the forest fire fighting operation.

BC Wildfire Services consider this to be a small wildfire and as such do not conduct or publish a detailed investigation. The fire was noted to be in the vicinity of high voltage power lines, and no obvious cause was found.

Potential additional measures to avoid forest fires and mitigation measures related to the residual adverse effects of this fire will be continue to be considered with an updated report to be completed by October 18, 2021.

## Appendix 1: Approximate location of wildfire



**Figure 1**  
July 2021 Approximate Wildfire Location

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Date: August 18<sup>th</sup> 2021